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1. People v. Crooker, 47 Cal. 2d 348 (1956).
2. “Miranda warnings” refer to the admonitions constitutionally required by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution pursuant to the landmark United
States Supreme Court decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda
decision is arguably one of the most influential and controversial legal cases of the 20th
century.
* Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.
3. See Donald E. Wilkes, The Attempted Murder of the Miranda Decision, available at
http://www.law.uga.edu/academics/profiles/dwilkes_more/31miranda.html (last visited Mar.
8, 2007).
Justice Carter’s Dissent in
People v. Crooker:1 An Early
Step Towards Miranda
Warnings2 and the Expansion
of the Fifth Amendment to
Pre-Trial Confessions
By Helen Y. Chang*
Introduction
By the middle of the 20th century, police interrogation of criminal suspects
had developed into a fine art designed to extract confessions. The use of the
“third degree,” otherwise known as the infliction of physical or mental suffer-
ing, was not uncommon.3 “[T]he most frequently utilized interrogation tech-
niques have involved mental and psychological stratagems—trickery, deceit,
deception, cajolery, subterfuge, chicanery, wheedling, false pretenses of sym-
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4. Id.
5. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436. Miranda remains one of the most famous criminal law
cases the U.S. Supreme Court has ever decided, and the Miranda warnings may be the most
famous words the Court has ever written. TheMiranda Debate: Law, Justice, and Polic-
ing 249 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998).
6. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
7. Id. at 436.
8. Id. at 455.
9. Id. at 474.
10. Edmund G. (Pat) Brown was Governor of California from 1959–1967. In his sec-
ond day in office, Brown received John Crooker’s petition for clemency. Brown conducted
a hearing and concluded that Crooker had a long history of mental illness. Brown com-
muted Crooker’s death sentence to life imprisonment. See Edmund G. (Pat) Brown & Dick
Adler, Public Justice, Private Mercy, A Governor’s Education on the Death Row
5, 11–19 (1989).
pathy, and various other artifices and ploys.”4 As the United States Supreme
Court noted in its famous Miranda v. Arizona decision,5 this type of police in-
terrogation involved “inherent compulsion,”6 was “inherently coercive,”7
“exact[ed] a heavy toll on individual liberty and trad[ed] on the weakness of
individuals.”8 In sum, police interrogation tactics in and before the 1950s were
contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness and justice set forth in the
Constitution.
In People v. Crooker, Justice Carter was the lone dissenter with an unpopu-
lar position: reverse the criminal conviction of a self-confessed murderer. Why
did Justice Carter dissent? For the now recognized principles that a criminal sus-
pect is entitled to an attorney during custodial interrogation, and if he or she
requests counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.9
Unfortunately for Mr. Crooker, in 1956, such protections were not yet con-
stitutionally mandated. Miranda would not be decided for another 10 years.
Mr. Crooker’s confession, extracted during a police interrogation without the
benefit of legal counsel, was admitted into trial. Mr. Crooker was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death.10
Factual Background
In 1955, John Russell Crooker was a 31-year old law student working as a
houseboy for a wealthy Southern California matron, Mrs. Norma McCauley.
During his employment, Mr. Crooker became involved in an intimate and se-
cret affair with Mrs. McCauley. Several days prior to her death, Mrs. McCauley
informed Mr. Crooker that “they had been found out” and he agreed never to
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11. Crooker v. Calif., 357 U.S. 433, 435 (1958). Mr. Crooker was later released on pa-
role and became a model citizen; Mr. Crooker sent an annual Christmas card to Justice
Mosk, who wrote the majority opinion for the California Supreme Court upholding Mr.
Crooker’s murder conviction. See Gerald F. Uelmen, “Remembering Stanley Mosk,” 28
CACJ Forum 22 (2001).
12. See Crooker, 357 U.S. at 436.
13. Defendant testified that he made repeated requests for an attorney from the time
of his arrest and throughout his questioning by the officers. Officer Gotch testified that the
first time defendant asked to call an attorney was at the Central Station, when the follow-
ing occurred:
Q. When he made the request for an attorney, what did you tell him? A. I asked
him who did he want for an attorney.
Q. And he said what? A. He stated he didn’t know.
Q. What else did he say on this subject? A. I stated to him that after our investi-
gation was concluded he could call an attorney, and if he didn’t have funds to
hire an attorney, when he went to Court a public defender would be assigned to
handle his case.
He then stated that he had a friend who had been an instructor at Pepperdine College
that would probably handle the case for him. I asked him who the name was, and he said
it was a man by the name of Simpson, who lived in Long Beach.
People v. Crooker, 47 Cal. 2d 348, 351–52 (1956).
14. Id. at 352.
15. See Crooker, 357 U.S. 433, 436 (1958).
see her again.11 Despite his promise, Mr. Crooker went to Mrs. McCauley’s
home in the late afternoon of July 4, 1955. Finding no one home, he hid in a
closet in the children’s room and waited for her return. Because of the holiday,
Mrs. McCauley had attended a Fourth of July barbeque and returned home
around half past midnight. Mr. Crooker choked, strangled, and then stabbed
Mrs. McCauley to death. Mrs. McCauley’s son discovered her body in the
morning.
On July 5, 1955, at 1:30 p.m., Mr. Crooker was arrested at his apartment.
Mr. Crooker was taken to a Los Angeles Police Station, where he was pho-
tographed and asked to take a lie detector test. He refused to submit to the
test, and indicated that he wanted to call an attorney.12 This was the first of
many requests for an attorney made by Mr. Crooker during his time in police
custody. In fact, during this official police interrogation by four officers, Mr.
Crooker specifically identified the attorney he wished to call.13 Mr. Crooker
was told that he could call his attorney after the police had concluded their in-
vestigation.14
Mr. Crooker remained in police custody and his interrogation by four po-
lice officers continued for the next fourteen hours into the early morning hours
of July 6, 1955.15 Mr. Crooker finally signed a detailed written confession at 2:00
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16. Id.
17. Id.
18. People v. Crooker, 47 Cal. 2d at 355.
19. Id.
20. See Crooker, 357 U.S. at 437.
21. See People v. Crooker, 47 Cal. 2d at 353–54.
22. Justice Mosk wrote the majority opinion for the California Supreme Court. Justice
Carter was the lone dissenter. See People v. Crooker, 47 Cal. 2d 348 (1956).
23. See Crooker, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
24. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
25. The four specific Miranda warnings are: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) anything
said can be used against him; (3) the right to an attorney; and, (4) if unable to afford an
attorney, one will be appointed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–79 (1966).
26. Id. at 534.
a.m.16 At 5 a.m., he was jailed and allowed to sleep.17 Later that day, Mr. Crooker
was taken to the district attorney’s office and asked to repeat his confession.
When Mr. Crooker again asked for an attorney, the district attorney permit-
ted a telephone call to Mr. Simpson, the attorney previously requested by Mr.
Crooker. Mr. Crooker told Mr. Simpson that the police were making him an-
swer questions.18 The district attorney interjected that no coercion had been used
and that “everything defendant said was free and voluntary.”19 Mr. Crooker
met with Mr. Simpson later that evening and was thereafter represented by
counsel.20
The trial court found that Mr. Crooker’s confession was free and voluntary,
and allowed it to be read to the jury.21 The jury convicted Mr. Crooker of first
degree murder and sentenced him to death. Mr. Crooker appealed his con-
viction to the California Supreme Court,22 and then to the United States Supreme
Court.23 All appeals failed. Mr. Crooker’s death sentence was later commuted
by California Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown.24
Justice Carter’s dissent in People v. Crooker marked the beginning of the ju-
diciary’s unwillingness to allow unfettered police interrogation and set the stage
for the United States Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona.
Miranda reached two conclusions: (1) that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applied to all custodial interrogation; and, (2) that
specific warnings regarding the suspect’s constitutional rights to remain silent
and request legal counsel must precede any custodial interrogation.25 In reach-
ing this important and controversial decision, the Miranda Court recognized
that custodial police interrogation was “inherently coercive,”26 implicating the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that any confes-
sion obtained from such custodial interrogation was inadmissible into evi-
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27. Id. at 444.
28. See People v. Crooker, 47 Cal. 2d at 360.
dence at trial.27 Although Justice Carter relied upon the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, he essentially reached those same conclusions in
his dissenting opinion, noting, “if our constitutional safeguards are to be ob-
served, they should be observed to the letter.”28 Since Mr. Crooker’s confes-
sion was made without the benefit of counsel that had been requested, Justice
Carter believed that Mr. Crooker’s conviction should have been reversed for error.
DISSENT
Carter, J. I dissent.
I disagree with the italicized portion of the following statement from the
majority opinion:
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the fed-
eral Constitution and article I, section 13, of the California Constitution
guarantee a defendant the right to be represented by counsel in every
stage of the proceedings, and deprivation of this guarantee may be a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To
constitute deprivation of due process, however, the denial of the right of
the accused to be represented by counsel in every stage of the proceedings
must have so fatally infected the regularity of his trial and conviction as
to violate the fundamental aspects of fairness and result in a miscarriage
of justice. (citations omitted).”
. . . .
In In re Masching, 41 Cal. 2d 530, 534, defendant requested counsel, and a
continuance on the ground that he had been “confined to bed.” His request
was denied. We there said that “Under all the circumstances this procedure
amounted to a denial of petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel. It follows
that his conviction cannot be permitted to stand and that he should be re-
manded to custody for further proceedings in the municipal court in con-
formity with his right to counsel. (citations omitted).
In People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal. 2d 569, 575 we said. . .
The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute
to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial. . . . Although the Sixth Amendment
is applicable only to trials in federal courts, (citation omitted) the
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same right is protected in this state by article 1, section 13 of our Con-
stitution providing that ‘In criminal prosecutions, in any court what-
ever, the party accused shall have the right . . . to appear and defend,
in person and with counsel.’
In People v. Robinson, 42 Cal. 2d 741, we [stated:] “Even as we have held
that the right to the assistance of counsel is so fundamental that the denial by
a state court of a reasonable time to allow the selection of counsel of one’s own
choosing, and the failure of that court to make an effective appointment of
counsel, may so offend our concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing as
to amount to a denial of due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.” (citation omitted).
[I]t appears to me that the statement in the majority opinion heretofore set
forth is incorrect. . . . “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too funda-
mental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” (citation omitted).
. . . .
The defendant’s confession was undoubtedly an important factor in defen-
dant’s conviction of the crime of which he was accused. The confession was made
without benefit of counsel which had been requested by defendant. It appears
to me that if our constitutional safeguards are to be observed, they should be
observed to the letter. This concept is forcibly declared by the Supreme Court
of the United States in a recent decision (Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 [76 S. Ct. 497, 100 L.Ed. 511]), decided March 26, 1956). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter speaking for the court stated:
Nothing new can be put into the Constitution except through the
amendatory process. Nothing old can be taken out without the same
process.
No doubt the constitutional privilege may, on occasion, save a guilty
man from his just deserts. It was aimed at a more far-reaching evil—
a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in
their stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed of more
importance than occurrence of the lesser evil. Having had much ex-
perience with a tendency in human nature to abuse power, the Founders
sought to close the doors against like future abuses by law-enforcing
agencies.
As no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none should suf-
fer subordination or deletion. It is appropriate to read the conviction
expressed in a memorable address by Senator Albert J. Beveridge to the
American Bar Association in 1920, a time when there was also man-
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29. Mr. Crooker appealed the California Supreme Court’s decision to the United States
Supreme Court. The appeal centered on the admissibility of his confession that was ob-
tained without the benefit of legal counsel. In a 5–4 decision, the United States Supreme
Court upheld Mr. Crooker’s capital murder conviction. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958).
ifested impatience with some of the restrictions of the Constitution
in the presumed interest of security. His appeal was to the Constitu-
tion–to the whole Constitution, not to a mutilating selection of those
parts only which for the moment find favor. [He said:] ‘If liberty is
worth keeping and free representative government worth saving, we
must stand for all American fundamentals–not some, but all. All are
woven into the great fabric of our national well-being. We cannot hold
fast to some only, and abandon others that, for the moment, we find
inconvenient. If one American fundamental is prostrated, others in
the end will surely fall. The success or failure of the American theory
of society and government, depends upon our fidelity to every one of
those inter-dependent parts of that immortal charter of orderly free-
dom, the Constitution of the United States.’ (Beveridge, The Assault
upon American Fundamentals, 45 Reports of American Bar Assn.,
188, 216 [1920].) To view a particular provision of the Bill of Rights
with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted application of it. This
is to disrespect the Constitution.
I am of the opinion that defendant’s requested instruction relative to the
jury’s disregard of the confession should have been given. Defendant was en-
titled to, and should have been accorded, the right to counsel at the time he
made the confession. As a result, the confession was obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights and should not have been considered by the jury.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.
Comment
Justice Carter’s dissent in Crooker was based upon an interpretation of the
Constitution that would not be recognized until eight years after Crooker’s
case was heard by the United States Supreme Court.29
Indeed, the historical development of the modern American privilege against
self-incrimination is convoluted and the privilege was slow to develop as a fun-
damental constitutional right. Although the right to remain silent against in-
criminating questions is set forth in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
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30. U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself. . . .”).
31. Kathleen B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Fifth Amendment Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist. 235, 235 (1998).
32. Id.
33. Hazlett, supra note 31 at 235 (citing Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
34. Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. at 627–38 (1886) (relying on English and American legal his-
tory to support the conclusion that the 4th and 5th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
protected individuals from government intrusion; rejecting the arguments that the amend-
ments applied only to criminal proceedings and where there was a physical invasion of prop-
erty).
35. See Hazlett, supra note 31 at 236 (citing 8 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on
Evidence §2250 (3d ed. 1940)).
36. See Hazlett, supra note 31 at 236 (discussing John Langbein, The Historical Origins
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047, 1047
(1994); Henry E. Smith, The Modern Privilege: Its Nineteenth-Century Origins, in The Priv-
ilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and Development (1997); Eben Moglen, Tak-
ing the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
92 Mich. L. Rev. 1086 (1994)).
37. Id.
Constitution,30 for the first ninety years after its adoption, American courts
limited the application of the constitutional privilege to a defendant in his or
her own criminal proceeding.31 In civil proceedings, the “privilege against self-
incrimination” referred to the common law right of a witness not to answer
incriminating questions.32 The modern American privilege against self-in-
crimination, which combines both the common law witness privilege and the
constitutional criminal privilege, was not articulated until the 1886 decision of
Boyd v. United States.33 In Boyd, the Supreme Court held that any witness or
party in a criminal or civil proceeding holds the right to remain silent under
the Fifth Amendment.34
The explanation behind the American courts’ delay in recognizing the priv-
ilege as an important civil liberty most likely lies in the English common law
development of the privilege. Traditionally, the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was thought to have developed from the use of the oath ex officio in the
16th century English ecclesiastical courts.35 Modern scholars dispute the ori-
gin of the privilege in the ecclesiastical courts.36 The research of John Lang-
bein, Henry Smith, and Eben Moglen trace the origins of the English privilege
to the emergence of defense counsel and changing rules of evidence in the 18th
century.37 The common law witness privilege allowed even a non-party to re-
fuse to answer incriminating questions in both civil and criminal proceedings.
Thus, early American cases involving criminal confessions applied the broader
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38. See Hazlett, supra note 31, at 240.
39. See Hazlett, supra note 31, at 240 (citing U.S. v. The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte, 8
U.S. 443, 446 (1808) (“It is contrary to the principles of the common law to make a man
criminate himself.”); U.S v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1225 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (“I shall certainly
not attempt to invalidate the maxim, ‘that no one is bound to inculpate himself.’ It is too
well established, and too sacred in its nature, to admit of a dispute.”); U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
55 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (discussing that constitutional arguments were frequent at the time,
such as “constitution” being mentioned nearly one hundred times in the “long opinions
surround the treason trial of Aaron Burr. . . . [B]ut never in association with the heated de-
bates about privilege against self-incrimination those cases presented.”).
40. See Hazlett, supra note 31 at 241 (citing U.S. v. Quitman, 27 F. Cas. 680 (C.C.E.D.
La. 1854)).
41. U.S. v. Quitman, 27 F. Cas. 680, 681 (C.C.E.D. La. 1854).
42. Beginning in 1868, Congress enacted two witness immunity statutes which were in-
tended to raise federal revenue by compelling a taxpayer to produce prior records (for the
purpose of determining back taxes owed) without subjecting the taxpayer to criminal tax
liability. See Hazlett, supra note 31, at 245–251, n.49, n.50, n.70 (citing 15 Stat. 37 (1868);
U.S. v. Hughes, 26 F. Cas. 421, 423 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875); 18 Stat. 186 (1874)).
43. See Hazlett, supra note 31, at 248 (discussing statutes to “aide in the collection of rev-
enues”); Id. at 245 (citing U.S. v. Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1273 (C.C.D. Or. 1871) as an example
of courts applying the 1868 witness immunity statute broadly).
44. See id. at 249–50 (citing In re Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261 (C.C.D. Nev. 1871); U.S. v.
Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 150 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1875); U.S. v. Mason, 26 F. Cas.
1189, 1191 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1875); U.S. v. Distillery No. Twenty-Eight, 25 F. Cas. 868, 869
(C.C.D. Ind. 1875)).
common law witness privilege.38 Those cases did not refer to the Fifth Amend-
ment as a basis for excluding such confessions from evidence.39 The Supreme
Court addressed this distinction in its 1854 decision of United States v. Quit-
man40 by stating, “The Constitution of the United States does not allow the
examination of a witness in any criminal case against himself, except with his
consent. The common law of evidence extends the exemption, and he is not
required to answer in any case either as a witness or a party” when the answer
would incriminate him or subject his property to forfeiture.41
The passage of two witness immunity statutes in the 19th century was a sig-
nificant development in the path towards the modern American privilege.42
Although the two statutes were intended to raise tax revenue by compelling
the production of prior records without incurring criminal tax liability, case
law expanded the scope of the statutes to apply outside the tax arena.43 More-
over, defense counsel began to argue, albeit unsuccessfully, that the witness
privilege was a part of the Fifth Amendment.44 This litigation raised an im-
portant issue as to whether the witness privilege was a part of the common
law or the Constitution since Congress had the authority to abrogate the com-
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45. See Hazlett, supra note 31, at 251.
46. See id. at 252–60 (discussing Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). Mr. Boyd supplied
glass to the federal government for use in the construction of several government build-
ings. Mr. Boyd was permitted to import duty-free the amount of glass supplied to the gov-
ernment. When Boyd claimed that a certain amount of glass had broken during shipment,
thereby allowing him to import that amount duty-free, the government disputed his claim
and subpoenaed the invoices. Id.
47. Id. at 252 (quoting Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 639 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring)).
48. Miranda was a consolidation of four cases: Westover v. U.S.; Vignera v. N.Y.; Calif.
v. Stewart; and Miranda v. Arizona. None of the defendants were advised of their constitu-
tional right to remain silent or their right to counsel. All defendants had confessed during
police interrogation. All confessions were admitted into evidence and all defendants were
convicted of the crimes charged. The cases were consolidated because of their common
“salient features—incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated at-
mosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights.” See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 456–57.
49. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
50. Id. at 461.
51. Id. at 473–74.
mon law but not the Constitution.45 That issue was finally decided in the 1886
decision of Boyd v. United States.46 In Boyd, the Supreme Court held that the
1874 witness immunity statute was “unconstitutional and void” because it
caused a person “to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.”47 Since Boyd was a civil proceeding, the Court expanded
the scope of the constitutional privilege to so apply, thus concluding that Con-
gress lacked the authority to abrogate the privilege. The modern American
privilege against self-incrimination was born. Post-Boyd, the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination was applied to parties and witnesses
in any judicial proceeding, thus erasing the prior distinction between the com-
mon law witness privilege and the constitutional privilege.
Perhaps the most significant judicial interpretation of the modern Ameri-
can Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination came in the Supreme
Court’s 1966 decision of Miranda v. Arizona.48 In Miranda, the Court held that
the Fifth Amendment privilege applied even before trial to “custodial interro-
gations,” thus extending the constitutional protection of the privilege to pre-
trial confessions.49 Prior to Miranda, courts determined the admissibility of
pre-trial confessions under the standard of “voluntariness”50 according to the
Due Process Clause. Post-Miranda, pre-trial confessions obtained during cus-
todial interrogation without the benefit of legal counsel or a waiver of such, were
deemed conclusively coercive and inadmissible. Further, if the suspect requests
an attorney, the police are required to cease the interrogation.51
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52. See Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present, and Future A Re-
view of the Miranda Debate: Law, Justice, and Policing, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1251, 1258 (Richard
A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1999).
The Miranda decision generated much debate and controversy, including
whether the warnings are too confusing, over-inclusive, under-inclusive, over
the procedures required for the warnings, and the procedures required for an
effective waiver. Also leveled was the criticism that criminals would be acquit-
ted because of “technicalities.”52
Justice Carter’s lone dissent in Crooker should be heralded as a marker to the
end of unfettered police interrogation and the beginning of increased judicial
scrutiny regarding criminal confessions. Justice Carter’s vision of an exclu-
sionary rule for criminal confessions obtained without the benefit of counsel
has become the modern rule of law.
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